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This thesis examines various Department of Defense (DOD)
transportation issues relating to the Military Sealift
Command (MSC), Military Airlift Command (MAC), and the
Military Traffic Management Command ( MTMC ) . Specifically, a
history of the MSC, the demise of breakbulk shipping, and its
impact on strategic sealift requirements are discussed; a
history of the MAC, its reliance on the civil airline
industry for augmentation of organic airlift resources (Civil
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program), and the status of the CRAF
are reviewed; and a history of the MTMC, its rationale for
owning rail assets, and the feasibility of a CRAF-type
program for rail are examined. Additionally, a brief
overview of the newly organized United States Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM) and its impact on the Transportation
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The current capability of the United States Department of
Defense (DOD) to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide
is dependent upon a mixture of airlift, land transportation,
and sealift forces--the defense transportation system.
Transportation is a key factor of any nation's military
ability. Because of the critical role of transportation in
our national defense, it is important to study the evolution
of the defense transportation system and analyze the cause
and effect relationships of major problem areas within the
present system. [Ref. l:p. 18]
The primary mission of the defense transportation system
is to provide logistical support for strategic mobility in
support of national security objectives. This demands a
logistical capacity to deploy and sustain military forces
whenever and wherever needed, as rapidly and as long as
operational requirements dictate. [Ref. 2:p. 16]
To sustain our forward military strategy and our forward
strategic mobility capability, the defense transportation
system consists of organizations that enhance the nation's
surge capability and sustainability during conflict. These
organizations are called transportation operating agencies
(TOAs). As sole managers of a particular transportation
9
resource, the TOAs collect and analyze requirements within
their areas of transportation responsibility and allocate
available capabilities. [Ref. 2:p. 16]
The defense transportation system is comprised of the
Military Sealift Command (MSC), the Military Airlift Command
(MAC), and the Military Traffic Management Command ( MTMC )
.
The relationship between the three TOAs is simple, MTMC will
load, plan, and manifest equipment that will be sealifted by
MSC. MSC will then "marry-up" equipment to the personnel
flown in by MAC [Ref. 2:p. 16].
Generally, each TOA acts independently with respect to
day-to-day operations. In the event of an emergency,
however, the TOAs work in conjunction to ensure adequate lift
is allocated. Previously, coordination of TOA assets was
assigned to the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) who allocated
transportation assets and provided information as required to
support theater Commanders in Chief. [Ref. 2:p. 16]
In April 1986, President Reagan announced plans to
replace the JDA with the United States Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM) as a result of recommendations from the Blue
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (The Packard
Commission). The commission, and other previous studies,
concluded that a unified transportation command would better
serve the national security interest of the United States and
its allies by centralizing responsibility for the most
10
effective use of the military's transportation system in
wartime [Ref . 3 :p. 1 ]
.
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The primary mission of the TOAs is to maintain the
required state of readiness necessary to support the
deployment/employment of combat forces. Within each TOA,
major problems exist which could adversely affect its
mission.
The MSC s strong breakbulk shipping capability has
diminished due to a continuing disappearance of breakbulk
shipping from the U.S. merchant marine inventory.
Conventional wisdom of military logistics planners has
dictated that the breakbulk freighter is more efficiently
designed for military purposes. Chapter II provides an
analysis of the need for breakbulk ships to meet strategic
sealift requirements.
The MAC relies heavily on the civilian airline industry
to augment organic airlift resources in the event of a
national emergency through a program called the Civil Reserve
Air Fleet (CRAF). The CRAF is projected to increase MAC '
s
airlift capability by 50^; however, current problems within
MAC and the airline industry render this projection
questionable. Chapter III will address these problems and
outline the current status of the CRAF program.
11
The MTMC manages the transportation of personnel,
equipment, and supplies throughout the continental United
States to MSC ' s ships, MAC'S aircraft, or to commercial
overseas carriers. To provide these services to all of DOD
,
MTMC functions as a transportation manager, operator,
advisor, and engineer. Chapter IV will discuss MTMC ' s role
as a transportation operator. Specifically addressed will be
MTMC ' s operation of the Defense Freight Railway Interchange
Fleet (DFRIF) and whether or not DOD should own rail assets.
Chapter IV presents conclusions and recommendations to
include a discussion of the newly developed USTRANSCOM.
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I I . MILITARY SEALIFT „COMMAND_lMSCi
A. INTRODUCTION
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is the DOD ' s strategic
sealift transportation force. Its primary mission is "to
provide sealift for strategic mobility in support of national
security objectives" [Ref. 4:p. 2]. In that role, it must
deploy and sustain military forces on a global basis, for as
long as needed. This is accomplished through two principal
sources: U.S. Government-owned ships and the U.S. merchant
marine. The Government-owned ships are operated by MSC and
used primarily for military exercises or kept in a reserve
status in the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) (Note 1)
or the Ready Reserve Force ( RRF ) (Note 2). These ships
provide only a small portion of the sealift capability
required. The U.S. -flag merchant marine fleet transports the
bulk of DOD cargo requirements in times of war or national
emergency. These ships are either chartered or requisitioned
by MSC from the U.S. merchant marine. [Ref. 4
:
p . 2]
Note 1: After World War II, excess merchant ships were sold
to citizens and noncitizens to reduce the size of the
inactive fleet. Those ships not sold were placed in the NDRF
and maintained by the Maritime Administration. These ships
augment the active U.S. fleet during times of national
emergency and can be activated in 30-45 days. [Ref. 5:p. 39]
Note 2: The RRF is a component of the NDRF and is comprised
of self-sustaining ships with a high degree of military
utility. They can be activated in 5, 10, or 20 days. Sources
13
for these ships are (1) upgraded NDRF ships, (2) MSC retired
ships, and (3) commercial sector procurement. [Ref. 3:p.
2-1]
Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr., outlined several problems
facing the MSC in his book, The Defense Transportation
System: Competitor or Complement to the Private Sector? Mr.
Whitehurst asserted that the continuing disappearance of
breakbulk shipping from the U.S. merchant marine inventory
would adversely affect DOD sealift capability.
This chapter will debate this assertion by:
1. Providing a brief history of the Merchant Marine
and the MSC
2. Providing an overview of breakbulk shipping
3. Discussing the capabilities of breakbulk ships as
well as its successors' capabilities (RO/RO,
barge-carrying, and containerships
)
4. Comparing the ships
5. Providing conclusions
B. MERCHANT MARINE/MSC HISTORY
The United States, in every war or conflict, has depended
heavily on the U.S. merchant marine to meet strategic sealift
requirements. [Ref. 7:p. 5]
Between 1800 and 1840, U.S. ships carried 90% of
America's foreign trade. The percentage declined during the
next two decades, but the U.S. clipper fleet still
transported 66-73% of the foreign trade. However, the advent
of the steamship in 1838 and the United States' unchanging
14
dependence upon its clipper fleet eventually dropped its
foreign commerce share to 10%. [Ref. 7:p. 5]
With a virtually non-existent merchant fleet at the
beginning of World War I, the U.S. government embarked on a
massive shipbuilding program. Between 1916 and 1919, more
than 3,200 ships were built; however, most of the ships were
delivered after the war ended. [Ref. 7:p. 5]
Prior to World War II, the United States was again faced
with inadequate sealift resources. The ships built during
World War I had been allowed to deteriorate. In response,
Congress enacted the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, which was
designed to promote a viable merchant fleet. Five hundred
new ships were to be built over a 10 year period; however,
World War II began just after this effort was initiated.
[Ref. 7:p. 6]
When the United States entered World War II, its most
noteworthy maritime contribution was not in vessel
design, but in the ability to mass-produce ships. The
best-known merchant ship of World War II was the Liberty
ship built three months before Pearl Harbor. All told,
2,742 vv/ere built. The Liberty was followed by the
Victory ship, of which 531 were constructed. Some 6,400
merchant-type ships, including 1,200 small craft, were
built between 1937 and 1945. At the war's end, the
government-controlled merchant fleet stood at over 5,000
vessels. [Ref 8:p. 27]
Throughout World War II, the Army and Navy maintained
separate ocean transport capabilities. In fact, four
organizations managed shipping operations in support of the
war effort: the Army Transportation Service, the Naval
Transportation Service, the War Shipping Administration, and
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the Fleet Service Forces. Subsequent to the war, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Navy manage all sealift
transportation. In 1949, the Military Sea Transportation
Services (MSTS) was established. At the same time, the
Maritime Administration and the Federal Maritime Board were
formed to adm.inister civilian maritime programs and subsidy
programs, respectively. In 1956, the Secretary of the Navy
(SECNAV) was designated as the DOD Single Manager for
sealift. [Ref. 7
:
pp . 6, 7]
Inadequate maritime support was an issue also in the
Korean Conflict for the following reasons:
1. The Maritime Administration was in its infancy, and
was operating under temporary leadership, lacking
even the basic authority to requisition ships or
enter into agreements by which requisite vessels
could be chartered.
2. The aging U.S. fleet was nearing obsolescence
(primarily because of vessel speed), and no
comprehensive shipbuilding program was in sight
to replace outmoded vessels.
3. The agency that had been responsible for the
majority of the logistical planning conducted prior
to 1950, the Security Resources Board, had oriented
most of its wartime planning toward long-range,
all-out war, such as had been experienced in World
War II. Planning for more limited, localized





The MSTS was the only agency capable of meeting the
initial strategic sealift requirements of the Korean
Conflict, eventually transporting 30,000 tons of military
supplies per day. This was accomplished through the
acquisition of over 400 chartered and government-owned
16
acquisition of over 400 chartered and government-owned
reserve ships, support from private operators, and a nucleus
fleet of 174 ships. The end of the Korean Conflict resulted
in yet another peacetime reduction of the merchant fleet.
[Ref. 7: pp. 8, 9]
In 1965, the MSTS-controlled fleet and the merchant
marine ships totalled 135 and 965, respectively. During the
Vietnam War, the ships activated from the NDRF and other
charters/general agency agreements totaled 501. This enabled
the MSTS to satisfy wartime sealift requirements. In 1970,
the MSTS was redesignated the Military Sealift Command. After
the war, the MSTS-controlled fleet and the merchant marine
were again reduced to meet peacetime requirements (See Table
1 for current inventory). [Ref. 7:pp. 8, 9, 10]
C. MSC ASSETS
Headquartered in Washington, D.C., MSC is comprised of
approximately 8,000 civil service employees, military
personnel, and contract mariners. Manpower allocations are
as f ol lows
:
1. 3,700 MSC ship crew members (civil service)
2. 2,015 non-government mariners (U.S. -flag ships)
3. 1,500 civil service employees and 350 Naval
Officers/enlisted personnel (shore-based staff)
4. 500 Navy military personnel (MSC Fleet Auxiliary
and Special Mission Support Ships) [Ref. 9:p.
25]
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As of September 1986, the MSC-control led ships totaled






Special Mission Support 22 ( 2
)
Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force 34 (4)
Preposi tioned & Fast Sealift Forces 9 (8)




Special Mission Support 2
Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force 2
Afloat Preposi tioning Forces 24
TOTAL CHARTERED 55
GENERAL AGENCY AGREEMENT
TOTAL MSC CONTROLLED 129 ( 14)
Note: Figures in parentheses, included in totals,
represent nucleus ships not in active operation, i.e.,
activating, inactivating, phasedown, ready reserve,
converting, and modification.
* Includes Bareboat Charters
** Does not include spot voyage charter ships
Source: Military Sealift Command 1986 Annual Report
Strategic Sealift programs have been initiated to enhance
strategic sealift capabilities. These efforts include:
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The conversion of eight containerships into Fast
Sealift Ships with rol 1-on/roll-of f (Ro-Ro) ramps
for wheeled vehicles (able to carry the equipment
for an Army heavy mechanized division).
The preposi t ioning of ships (13) near areas of
potential conflict (can support three Marine
brigades totalling approximately 50,000 men).
The Ready Reserve Force ( RRF ) will have an
inventory of 120 ships by 1992.
Twelve crane ships are projected to be delivered
and operational by FY 90.
Twenty-nine ocean surveillance ships delivered by
mid 1990s.
Five fleet oilers to be delivered by FY 89.
[Ref. 9:p. 25]
D. OVERVIEW OF BREAKBULK SHIPPING
Breakbulk shipping in the form of small coastal carriers
has been around since the beginning of seaborne commercial
activity many thousand years ago. Over the years,
productivity and cost measured in cost per ton-mile have been
inversely related as ships have increased in size and trade
routes increased in length. However, as economies of scale
at sea grew, they were degraded by diseconomies in ports.
Costly port time and bottlenecks for the larger general cargo
ships with proportionately bigger cargoes increased. Ports
weren't taking advantage of new technology as fast as the
shipping companies were: stevedoring, transshipments, and
storage remained essentially unchanged. This lack of
19
progress and the associated costs pushed shipping companies
into even more elaborate technology to reduce reliance on
port operations whose management was unresponsive.
[Ref.lO:pp. 92-99]
Shipping is an extremely dynamic business that has few
entry and exit barriers. Although ships are expensive, the
industry isn't considered particularly capital intensive
because the ocean "highway" is free to the user. The
terminal infrastructure can be provided by others, permitting
shipping companies flexible ship utilization (to meet
evolving market conditions and strategies). Conversely, port
management has the perspective of managing a long term
(probably national) asset which serves many social, political
and economic purposes in addition to the purpose of loading
and off-loading ships. [Ref. 10:pp. 92-99]
The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 encouraged and restated
the need for a strong merchant marine and a viable shipping
industry. It recognized that world trade had shifted from
liner service to cargoes of bulk commodities prevalently
transported in tramps or privately-owned ships. Other ship
operational considerations included shifts to bigger ships,
shorter port turnaround times, and decreasing manpower
requirements associated with the newer, technologically
advanced ships. For shipbuilding, the Act reflected more
efficient, and even competitive, world markets. [Ref. 10:p.
103]
20
The Act's direction to shipping companies to become more
competitive on the world markets encouraged companies to
invest in new ships which would be unsuitable for most heavy
military purposes. For instance, although breakbulk shipping
was thriving in world trade as evidenced by the makeup of the
ships delivered worldwide in 1978, not a single breakbulk
ship has been built in the U.S. since the Act was passed.
While not completely responsible, the Act indicated the
future path the U.S. government was planning to take
regarding breakbulk shipping and the merchant marine.
Although breakbulk shipping was encouraged by the Act, the
U.S. continued to lose market share in this basically
non-liner trade. [Ref. 10:pp. 112, 113]
Common carriers operating routinely on established routes
are referred to as liner companies. There were 19 of these
companies twenty years ago; there were only seven in 1985.
This decline has become predictable over the past several
decades and has shown every indication of continuance despite
support programs and measures enacted in the form of
construction differential subsidies, operating differential
subsidies, capital construction funds. Title XI guarantees,
and reservation of 509$ of government cargo. [Ref. 11 :p. 64]
Three decades of neglect have resulted in today's
sealift shortage. Several generations of service chiefs and
senior civilians in the Pentagon, White House, Office of
21
Management and Budget, and Congress (who make the final
budget decisions) can claim credit for the current state of
breakbulk shipping. [Ref. 12:p. 21]
Even more serious than the lack of in-house sealift
assets, is that the Pentagon can no longer rely completely on
U.S. -flag merchant marine assets (as was done for the last
three major conflicts) for sealift requirements. Since the
late 1970s, there has been insufficient gross U.S. -flag
sealift capacity (U.S. -flag ships available for projected
national sealift needs). Moreover, many of the ships that
are available are too highly specialized for general military
sealift requirements. [Ref. 12:p. 21]
E. DISCUSSION/PROBLEMS
From the standpoint of national security, one of the most
important distinctions to be made among cargo ships is that
of military utility. Generally, ships supporting military
operations are more useful if they are:
1. Relatively small - able to go in and out of
shallow harbors and narrow channels;
2. Flexible - able to carry a variety of cargoes;
3. Self-sustaining - able to load and off-load cargo
without specialized shore facilities [Ref. 13:p.
32] .
Ships that have restricted military usefulness include:
dry bulk or ore ships, LNG/LPG tankers, special product
tankers, refrigerator ships, ferries, harbor tugs, coated
22
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tankers over 80,000 DWT , uncoated tankers, and Great Lakes
operators. [Ref. 14:p. 24]
Current literature indicates that militarily desirable
characteristics are at-odds with characteristics of the most
efficient ships. Commercial ships tend to be large,
specialized, and dependent on port facilities for efficient
loading and off-loading of cargo. [Ref. 13:p. 32] Current
economics of trade demand ships that are ill-suited to
military requirements. [Ref. 1 5
:
p . 20]. Conventional wisdom
of military logistics planners reflects that the breakbulk
freighter with its old-fashioned cargo rigging is more
efficiently designed for military purposes even though large
crews are required to operate and load/unload them. This is
true primarily because of their minimal pier support
requirements. [Ref. 13:p. 32]
Generally there are three basic types of militarily
useful ships besides the breakbulk: the self-sustaining (SS)
and non-self-sustaining (NSS) containership , the
roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ship, and the barge ship
( lighter-aboard-ship (LASH) and the sea barge (SEABEE) type).
Eighty-five percent of general cargo can be placed in
containers. The remaining cargo has required the design and
manufacture of heavy capacity loading and unloading machinery
and systems. Larger deck and superstructure openings and
increased cargo areas allowed these ships to accommodate a
23
wider range of cargo types. In addition, special
combination-type vessels v;ere designed which could
accommodate bulk cargoes, containers and conventional
breakbulk cargo, i.e., SL-7 (Fast Sealift Support Ships).
[Ref. 16:p. 122]
In the following section, characteristics, advantages,
disadvantages, and comparisons of the breakbulk, the RO/RO,




The most recent breakbulk type ship is the Challenger
class C-4 . Causeway sections, LCM-8s (landing craft,
mechanized, Mark VIII), and other outsized cargo can be
carried on the weather deck of such craft. Most of the ships
are old, however, and have a limited lifting capability.
They are self-sustaining in port operations, but require
large teams of personnel for rigging operations, and
turnaround time is extended as a result. Freighter discharge
rates are low compared to modern ships, and many
transshipment points must be operated to handle large cargo
capacities quickly. Terminal requirements for breakbulk
shipping are large; consequently, reliance on mobilization of
Reserve Component units to provide terminal support is
necessary. Although any ship is valuable in wartime, the low
Logistics Over-the-Shore (LOTS) delivery rate, relatively
24
long load-out times required, and high system costs make
breakbulk freighters the least satisfactory ship type for
modern military supports. [Ref. 17:pp. 1-18-29]
The major advantages of the breakbulk ships are:
1. Their ability to be loaded and unloaded in the
underdeveloped and damaged port facilities
through the use of their on board booms [Ref.
18:p. 17]
.
2. They are suitable for LO/LO without major
changes
.
3. They are suitable for outsize cargo without
change, subject to limitation of lift capacity.
4. They are suitable for lighters for LCM-8 and
smaller craft at stow locations where lift
capacity permits [Ref. 17:p. 1-26].
The major disadvantages are:
1. Their conventional cargo-handling systems have
relatively slow loading/discharge rates.
Additionally, only approximately one-half of the
breakbulk ships have cranes with the capacity of
60 tons, the minimum required for handling heavy
military equipment [Ref. 18:p. 20].
2. They are not suitable for RO/RO without major
change. They would require ramps and doors in
the shell and bulkheads. This would be costly,
would seriously affect ship survivability, and is
considered not feasible.
3. They are limited in container capability due to
difficulty of moving within holds and lack of fit
of cube to space.
4. They are incapable of transporting
Non-Self-Deployable-Airrraf t (NSDA) due to lack
of headroom [Ref. 17 :p. 1-26],
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G. BARGE SHIPS
The barge-carrying ship is nearly as versatile as the
breakbulk freighter and provides the capability to transport
many kinds of equipment which are hard to handle on
conventional freighters. Turnaround time for a barge carrier
to lead/unload is very short, thereby increasing its
potential for movement of cargo. With respect to military
significance, the barge-carrier system is able to provide its
own lighterage. Off-loading barges at the shoreline is an
easier operation than unloading ships in port. [Ref. 17:p.
1-21 ]
_. There are two types of barge ships in the U.S. merchant
fleet: the LASH type and the SEABEE type. These two types
are sufficiently different to warrant separate description.
LASH ships have been built on both C-8 and C-9 hulls and
can carry barges or containers or both. Containers, when
carried, are loaded and discharged by an on-board container
crane. The barges are loaded/unloaded by means of a 500-ton
capacity gantry crane, which is mounted aboard an adapter
(designated the LCM-8 Lifting Beam). This allows the gantry
crane to lift other items such as landing craft and causeway
sections onto and off of the ship. [Ref. 18:p. 20]
Folding platforms can be used for carriage of non-barge
cargo on LASH ships. When the ship carries barges, these
platforms are collapsed and stowed along the bulkheads of the
barge loading area. When the ship carries breakbulk cargo,
the platform would be broken out and erected by the ship's
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crane. The primary objection to this method is that the
barge crane is incompatible with breakbulk cargo and would
necessitate modification depending upon the cargo. [Ref.
17:p. 1-23] The additional advantages of the LASK ship are:
1. Vehicles in LO,'LO mode can be handled in barges.
2. For outsize cargo, it is suitable up to the
capacity of the barges. Larger equipment can be
carried on deck, if compatible with the crane.
3. Containers can be carried in barges although
stowage is lost on some barge designs. At the
cost of barge-carrying capability, ships of this
type have the capacity to carry some containers
in cells, and cell guides can be installed in
additional spaces. Containers can be loaded and
discharged at the rate of 15 an hour (subject to




1. NSDA is suitable only with substantial loss in
cargo stowage capability. Helicopters can be
placed in barges or carried below deck, stowed on
the tops of barges, with top barges omitted.
2. Only LCMs are suitable as lighters, and these
must be stowed on deck. [Ref. 17:p. 1-29].
The SEABEE ship is similar in size to the LASH ship
except that it carries barges substantially larger than the
LASH barge. Barge loading is accomplished by means of a
submerging 2,000-ton capacity elevator located in the stern
of the ship. The barge is positioned over the submerged
elevator which then lifts the barge from the water up to the
desired loading level. The barge is then transported
longitudinally on a rail system from the elevator platform to
the desired location for stowage. [Ref. 18:pp. 20-23]
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Military vehicles and all helicopters except the CH-54 can be
carried below deck with minimum disassembly when the barges
are absent. Helicopters can be flown off the top deck, and
can aid in fixed wing aircraft off loading. The SEABEE can
carry Army aircraft without sect ional izat ion and can carry
all items of equipment organic to Arm>y units. The critical
shortcoming of this ship type is that only three have been
built for commercial service. [Ref. 17:p. 1-22] The
advantages of the SEABEE are:
1. RO/RO is suitable via elevator.
2. LO/LO is suitable in barges.
3. Outsize cargo of a wider variety is possible with
a greater ease of handling.
4. Containers are suitable using materials handling
equipment or by stowing on chassis in RO/RO
configuration. Containers can be stowed on
barges
.
5. NSDA handling on two decks under cover and one
weather deck is possible.
6. Lighters are suitable up to the capacity of
elevator and transporter. Cradles are required
for shaped hulls.
7. Helicopters can be carried on this ship class
better than on any other merchant ship [Ref.
17:p. 1-28].
No major disadvantages of the SEABEE are evident.
The major advantages of both types of barge ships are:
1. They possess a rapid and self-contained loading/
unloading capability.
2. They have a capacity for heavy and/or outsize
loads
.
3. They require no lighterage.
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4. Their barges may be grouped and used as a
floating covered storage area [Ref. 18:p. 23].
An important characteristic of the barge-carrier system
is that the ships are large enough to carry equipment and
systems with which to establish port terminal facilities.
This constitutes a major improvement in force deployment
capabilities. [Ref. 17:p. 1-23]
The major disadvantages of both types of bargeships are:
1. LOTS problems still remain if a port is not
available. A deep draft (8-10 ft) precludes the
barges from being beached and from being unloaded
by cranes located at the beach.
2. Powered craft are required to move the barges
between the ship and the cargo unloading/loading
si te .
3. Transshipment problems remain [Ref. 18:p. 23].
H. CONTAINERSHIPS
A conventional containership is a ship specifically
designed to carry containers stacked in cells within the
ship. Since the cargo has an outer shield for protection,
the additional time required to secure the cargo is
eliminated. To load the ship, containers need only be lifted
aboard and placed into the appropriate cell. Even the hold
covers can serve as additional storage space upon which
containers can be stacked and secured. [Ref. 14:p. 14]
Containerships are classified into two general
categories: self-sustaining (SS) and non-self-sustaining
(NSS). The self-sustaining ship loads/unloads its containers
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with a gantry crane (or other integral lifting equipment),
independent of shore support. A number of the older, smaller
SS vessels will continue to serve certain trade routes and be
used for special purposes. [Ref. 18:p. 23] Unfortunately,
an inadequate number of SS ships are available to sustain a
reliable military sealift system. They are used primarily
for resupply operations, in small scale operations, and in
the opening phases of gradual force build-ups. [Ref. 17:p.
1-20]
New containerships depend upon terminal container cranes
for loading and discharge. Containership discharge systems
are required when there is a lack of commercial terminals or
when military exercises are conducted via LOTS. The two
significant options are to construct container cranes at
military terminals and to install cranes on NSS ships. Also,
the use of helicopters/blimps to load/unload containerships
in the absence of cranes is a viable solution. [Ref. 17:p.
1-20]
The capacity to carry general cargo is important. The
SEALAND SL-7S, for example, have about 14,000 square feet of
hold space reinforced to carry tanks and other heavy
equipment. Also, container ships can be converted to provide
open decks for breakbulk stowage of equipment. [Ref. 17 :p. I-
20] Sea sheds (Note 3) and flatracks (Note 4) achieve the
same objective without ship modification.
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Note 3: A sea shed is a cargo module that fits into a
container ship's cell guides. Essentially, the module
converts a container ship into a breakbulk ship. It can also
be used on bulk carriers. [Ref. 19:p. 307]
Note 4: Flat racks are designed to fit in the vertical cell
guides of containerships , and several may be placed side by
side to form a "tray" for outsize cargo. [Ref. 14:p. 33]
Converting containerships to carry breakbulk cargo has
potential military utility. However, this would adversely
affect productivity of the containership while still engaged
in commercial trade; consequently, it is acceptable only as a
last resort. [Ref. 17:p. 1-21]
The major advantages of containerships are:
1. Containers are ideally suited to move commercial
supplies and freight over land, sea, and air
routes from origin to destination; consequently,
there is an improved capability to integrate all
transportation modes.
2. It has a large cargo capacity. These ships have
annual cargo lift capacities equivalent to three
to five times those of breakbulk vessels.
3. It can be rapidly loaded and unloaded (70^ less
port time for containerships versus breakbulk
ships )
.
4. Its containers may be used for storage of cargo
ashore
5. Shorter transit times result in more frequent
sailings and more efficient asset utilization
[Ref. 14:pp, 15, 16]
.
The major disadvantages include:
1, NSS containerships require external facilities
for loading and unloading cargo.
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2. The size and weight of the cargo transported is
limited by the dimensional and structural
constraints of the containers [Ref. 18:p. 24].
3. Large marshalling areas are required to segregate
the containers prior to further movement. As a
result, these ships normally are constrained to
operate from one equipment-intensive port
facility to another. This characteristic reduces
the number of vessels available for support of
military operations in under-developed areas or
in support of LOTS operations without
causeway/ relocatable pier assets.
4. No hardware standardization within the container
community (in spite of the International
Standards Organization's efforts). Internal
structural strength and maximum weight capacities
differ among the various container users.
Individual firms continue to design and use
containers which best suit their own needs,




5. Different intermodal ships can accept only a
limited number of each size container or only a
specified size container. Consequently, few of
these high-tech ships can substitute for one
another in the commercial sector, let alone serve
the specialized military requirements without
major adaptation and auxiliary ship-to-shore
systems in most contingency situations [Ref.
1 4
:
pp . 16, 17].
I. RO/RO SHIPS
RO/ROs provide access for wheeled vehicles, via ramps, to
the interior and the various decks of the vessel. RO/ROs are
designed with a variety of configurations and deck heights
and for specific trades and certain classes of cargo and
rolling stock. One type incorporates the use of up to three
shore-based side ramps and is designed primarily for the
carriage of over-the-road semi-trailers. These ships have
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annual cargo lift capacities equivalent to three to five
times the lift capacities of breakbulk vessels. Any type of
wheeled vehicle can be accommodated: oversized trailers and
pieces of equipment, e.g., truck cranes and construction
equipment, and mobile homes can also be easily accommodated
on RO/RO ships. Every deck has sufficient headroom to permit
stowage of full-height truck-trailer units. Another type of
RO/RO is designed to handle a variety of cargo as well as
wheeled vehicles. [Ref. 16:p. 126]
The advantages of the RO/RO are:
1. They carry their own cargo handling equipment,
configured to negotiate the restricted
maneuvering area and low headroom below decks.
2. Containers can be stov^ed on or under the deck.
3
.
Some ships have a revolving crane on the
foredeck, which provides a limited LO/LO
capability [Ref. 16:p. 129].
4. NSDA is satisfactory if rolled on board [Ref.
17 :p. 1-30] .
The disadvantages of the RO/RO are:
1. They have limited outsize cargo capability,
except for the Sea Bridge class.
2. They are not suitable for lighters, except for
the Sea Bridge class [Ref. 17:p. 1-30].
3. The small RO/RO inventory limits their capacity
to deliver military vehicles for major
deployments. (The SEABEE class ship can provide
additional RO/RO capability. The LASH cannot,
because its basic hull structure prevents
installation of access doors for vehicle
drive-through) [Ref. 17:pp. 1-23, 24].
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Several types and sizes of RO/RO vessels are equipped
with loading ramps that lower directly from the stern. These
vessels must therefore moor fantail to pier to load or unload
cargo. This cavised problems in ports where the ships could
only approach from either side due to maneuvering or traffic
restrictions. In these instances, portable floating
platforms equipped with ballasting capability to permit
raising or lowering with respect to tidal ranges and vessel
ramp heights were developed. [Ref. 16:pp. 129, 131]
The RO/RO ships are critically important for sealift
support operations. Since vehicles are a significant part of
the military cargo requirement, particularly during build up
and reinforcement periods, even a few RO/RO ships impact
positively on the overall deployment shipping effort. The 23
RO/RO vessels in commission are favored also because of their
speed. [Ref. 17:p. 1-23]
J. CONCLUSIONS
The demise of breakbulk shipping is not a critical factor
in overall strategic mobility.
As mentioned, the most useful ships for military
operation planners tend to be relatively small, flexible
(able to carry a variety of cargoes), and self-sustaining.
Comparisons made between breakbulk and the RO/RO, barge, and
containerships reveal the following:
1. Relatively Small. The length of the breakbulk
ship is at least 100' less than the next smallest
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vessel, the containership . This allows for
greater maneuverability in small channels and, in
some instances, allows for mooring without tugs
if required. The beam of the breakbulk ship is
from 15' to 31' narrower, again allowing for
enhanced maneuverability (although not as much a
determining factor as the length of the vessel)
.
However, the draft of the smaller breakbulk ships
is only 2' less than RO/RO vessels and is as much
as 4 ' deeper than the least of the other ships
(LASH). This suggests that the other ships v^/ould
be better suited to shallow v/ater channels,
typical of those encountered in underdeveloped
countries. [Ref. 18:pp. 19, 21, 22, 25, 26]
Flexibil i ty
a. Although breakbulk ships are suitable for
LO/LO, lighters, and small craft, they
are not suitable for RO/RO and outsized
cargo subject to limit of lift capacity.
b. They are limited in container capacity
and NSDA capability.
c. RO/ROs, on the other hand, can handle a
wide variety of cargo to include general
cargo, containers, and outsized/heavy
cargoes (Sea Bridge class) and have LO/LO
capability.
d. Containerships have a large cargo
capacity, but they are not suitable for
RO/RO. Stowage of outsized cargo can be
achieved by on-deck tie down, flatracks,
and sea sheds
.
e. Barge-carrying ships approach the
versatility of the conventional breakbulk
ship and can carry a multitude of
equipment which is liard to handle on
conventional freighters. Besides the
barges and the variety of cargo that can
be carried in the barges, these ships
offer container capability, heavy lift,
and outsized cargo unrivaled by other
types of U.S. merchant vessels. [Ref.
20:p. 11]
(1) The LASH does not have RO/RO capability, but
LO/LO, outsized equipment, and containers can
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be handled in barges. It also has NSDA and
lighter capability.
(2) The SEABEE class is LO/LO, RO/RO, container,
NSDA, lighter, and outsize cargo (up to
capability of elevator/ transporter ) suitable.
3. Self-sustaining. One of the selling points of
breakbulk ships is that they are self-sustaining;
but this characteristic is also applicable to the
other ship types.
a. The RO/RO carries its own cargo handling
equipment and portable floating platform
to the pier and has a revolving crane,
b. Currently, only a small portion of the
containerships are SS; however, 12 crane
ships are to be operational by 1990, and
eight large containerships are being
converted into Fast Sealift Ships with
RO/RO ramps to alleviate the problem.
c. Barge-carrying LASH ships have on board
container and 500-ton gantry cranes. The
SEABEE vessels have a 2000-ton capable
elevator and can discharge its cargo in
open waters near contingency areas
without the aid of sophisticated port
facilities. For example, in the Joint
LOTS program, all forms of Table of
Organization and Equipment (TOE) handling
gear, which were truly outsized cargo,
were loaded on both the LASH and SEABEE.
Cranes, loaders, landing craft and
causeways were all handled. The SEABEE
even loaded an 800-ton DeLong Pier
without a container crane mounted on it.
[Ref. 20: p. 11]
Based on the above, the vessels most suitable for the
majority of military logistical support scenarios are RO/RO,
barge-carrying vessels, containerships, and breakbulk, in
approximately that order. Breakbulk shipping is still
required but its importance has waned as new OPPLANS have
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been developed to incorporate changed transportation
asset realities.
What impact has the demise of breakbulk shipping had on
the MSC? Since the MSC has a significant role in maintaining
a contingency sealift capability, the diminishing breakbulk
capability has forced the MSC to look elsewhere for
sealift assets. While working within the constraints of a
declining merchant marine and industrial base, MSC has
employed a combination of acquisitions, conversions, and new
ships. Additionally, new developments such as sea sheds and
flatracks have helped to overcome the breakbulk deficiency.
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III. MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND (MAC)
A. INTRODUCTION
Of the three Department of Defense ( DOD ) Transportation
Operating Agencies ( TOAs ) , the Military Airlift Command (MAC)
is the key to immediate response. MAC is the manager of all
DOD point-to-point international airlift with a tremendous
resource base comprised of a fleet of military cargo and
passenger aircraft, support personnel, specialized equipment,
and constant inter-service and civilian airline industry
coordination. This resource base is utilized to ensure MAC
meets its worldwide mission requirements. [Ref. 21 :p. 16]
U. S. military strategy depends heavily on airlift.
Maintaining a peacetime presence in overseas countries such
as West Germany and Korea with the ability to quickly
reinforce them in an emergency is one aspect of the strategy.
The other aspect is to have the capability of deploying
forces quickly to other countries where no peacetime
contingencies exist. [Ref. 22:p. 1-1]
The 1981 Congressional ly Mandated Mobility Study
established a strategic airlift requirement of 66 million ton
miles a day (mtm/d) [Ref. 23:p. 39]. The MAC is capable of
meeting about one-third of this requirement [Ref. 22:p. 1-1].
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet ( CRAF ) Program, a system by which
the DOD augments organic airlift and provides monetary
incentives for carriers to invest in aircraft suitable for
defense requirements, eliminates the deficit in passenger
airlift capacity. With respect to cargo airlift, where the
greatest shortfall exists, the CRAF is capable of providing
only 35% of the cargo airlift required to overseas locations
in the event of a national emergency. The shortfall exists
because of a general decline in the air cargo industry, which
is the focus of this chapter. Because the airlines, through
their voluntary participation in the CRAF, are projected to
carry 95% of the passenger and 35% of the cargo requirements,
military/civil relations are critical to airlift requirement
planning. [Ref. 21:p. 18]
This chapter will address the MAC/CRAF relationship,
including a brief history of both, current problems, and
conclusions. Also, the CRAF enhancement program, the
pre-deregulation environment, the effects of deregulation on
the CRAF, and the post-deregulation environment will be
discussed. Although the MAC has a multiplicity of other
roles to fill (weather information to all DOD agencies,
aeromedical airlift missions, and special operations forces),
these are beyond the scope of this chapter.
B. MAC HISTORY
The United States Army Air Forces and the Navy in all
theaters of operations provided air transportation during
World War I. Heavy airlift requirements and insufficient
aircraft resulted in the Secretary of War (under Presidential
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authorization) taking control of all transport aircraft
within the civil aviation industry. [Ref. l:p. 51]
World War I airlift requirements and efforts were minimal
relative to today. This was due to both the capability of
the aircraft and the knowledge of how to use airlift assets.
During the years between World War I and the United States'
entry into World War II, aircraft capabilities increased
dramatically. During World War II, airlift played a
significant role in transporting critical supplies and
forces. A complete history of airlift efforts in World War
II is outside the scope of this chapter; however, significant
airlift was employed in all theaters of conflict.
In June 1948, as part of the general reorganization of
the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense
consolidated the responsibility for large and long-range
airlift into the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). The
U.S. Navy, however, still had control of some airlift
capability. The charter of MATS resembled a commercial
airline's: the transportation of passengers and cargo on
scheduled flights. The first major milestone for the MATS
was the 1948 Berlin Airlift. This operation highlighted the
value of airlift to military and civil leaders and also
showed that current aircraft designs were unsatisfactory for







Another significant event in the growth of the MAC
occurred in 1956 when the Secretary of the Air Force was
designated as single manager for military airlift services.
Subsequetitly , MATS was designated the single manager
operating agency for military airlift services. Widely
scattered crises during the 1950s highlighted the need for
quick airlift response to support deployed forces. Jet
airlift aircraft gave MATS this capability. In 1965,
Congress recognized the importance of airlift and directed
that a new command be established and placed on a par with
other Air Force combat elements: On 1 July 1966, MATS
officially became MAC. [Ref. 1
:
pp . 52, 54]
The evolution of MAC continued during the Vietnam
conflict and post-conflict wind down. Eventually, Specified
Command status was approved by the President in 1976 and
became effective in 1977.
As a specified command, the Commander-in-Chief, MAC,
reports to the President through the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) during periods of conflict; and to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff during exercises; and as otherwise
necessary to insure operational support to the other
specified and unified commands." [Ref. l:p. 54]
Specified command status improved management of airlift
resources by simplifying and streamlining command
relationships and having the Commander in Chief of MAC report
directly to the National Command Authorities (as are other
Commanders in Chief of specified and unified commands). [Ref.
1 :p. 54]
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As part of the execution of its functional
responsibilities, MAC maintains aircraft in the various
levels of readiness required for strategic and tactical
airlift requirements and for airlift training exercises. MAC
routinely supports worldwide logistical needs of the DOD
aspart of training exercises. In addition, MAC participates
in annual joint training exercises ranging from individual
service efforts to joint allied efforts both to refine
procedures and demonstr . ;e airlift capability. [Ref.
l:pp.59, 60]
C. MAC ASSETS
From headquarters at Scott AFB , Illinois, the MAC directs
more than 94,000 active duty military and civilians and more
than 1000 aircraft at over 340 locations in 26 countries.
The command serves as the single DOD manager for airlift
requirements. In FY 1986, it moved 517,000 tons of air cargo
and 2,370,600 passengers on a combination of military and
commercial contract flights. [Ref. 24:p. 112]
As of November 1986, MAC had a total of 1,033 military
aircraft (Table 2). Also, MAC is augmented by aircraft
assigned to the Air Force Reserve Units (Table 3).
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1. As of November 1986
2. Numbers are total active aircraft inventory
3. Reserve Associate Units fly C-5, C-9, and C-141 aircraft
Source: Defense Transportation Journal 1987 Almanac,
February 1987, p. 21
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February 1987, p. 21
Journal 1987 Almanac
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Additional airlift is available through the Civil Reserve
Air Fleet (CRAF) program, a discussion of which follows.
D. CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET (CRAF)
The military/civil aviation relationship began in World
War II when civil aircraft delivered "more than four billion
passenger miles and one billion cargo ton miles for the
military overseas" under contract with the Air Transport
Command ( ATC ) and the Naval Air Transport Service [Ref. 25 :p.
12] .
President Truman created the CRAF in 1952 as a result of
the World War II and Berlin Blockade experiences when civil
aircraft supported military airlift. Approximately 505($ of
all ATC traffic was handled by each. The current
relationship between the Air Force and the airlines is based
on the initial foundation built by the ATC and the airline
industry. [Ref. 26:p. 93]
Under the CRAF program, selected U.S. civil aircraft are
contracted to augment DOD organic airlift in states of
emergency. Active duty organic airlift capability can be
doubled through CRAF augmentation which includes civilian
crews, fuel, spare parts and maintenance. [Ref. l:p. 60]
The CRAF program is composed of four segments: Domestic,
Alaskan, Short-Range International, and Long-Range
International. Aircraft are assigned to a segment depending
on the nature of the requirement and the performance
characteristics of the aircraft. [Ref. l:p. 60]
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1. Domes ti c/
A
laskan Segments
The Domestic segment consists of short- and
medium-range cargo aircraft. Alaskan segment aircraft
operate within the Alaskan Air Command's area of
responsibility. N!ost of this fleet provides Continental
United States ( CONUS ) airlift for the Air Force's LOGAIR and




Short- and Long-Range International Segments
The Short-Range International segment consists of
medium-range convertible cargo aircraft and supplements
theater airlift forces. The Long-Range International segment
is comprised of long-range passenger and cargo aircraft
involved in trans-at lant ic and trans-pacific requirements.
This fleet augments the MAC ' s long-range intertheater C-141s
and C-5s during periods of conflict. These civil aircraft
are contractually bound by the airlines in the event of
airlift emergencies. [Ref. l:p. 51]
E. CRAF STAGES
The CRAF program is initiated in three stages in order to
maximize aircraft utilizatior. and tailor available assets to






The Commander, MAC, authorizes Stage I activation which
is designed to allow continued civilian industry operations
while assisting the DOD . This stage occurs when MAC aircraft
are diverted from routine missions in response to a
contingency. Stage I aircraft must be made available within
24 hours. These aircraft are not the same as civilian
aircraft involved in the MAC daily operations. These can also
be assigned to Stages I, II, or III. [Ref.25:p. 13]
2 Stage_ 1
1
The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), in concert with the
Secretary of Transportation, activates Stage II in response
to minor contingency operations. Stage II provides
supplemental airlift within 24 hours during emergencies that
don't require national mobilization. [Ref. 25:p. 13]
3
.
S tage _I I
I
The President or Congress activates St^ge III after a
national emergency has been declared. The authority may be
delegated to the SECDEF in concert with the Secretary of
Transportation. Stage III activation may require all
long-range/heavy-lift cargo and passenger aircraft within 48
hours. The Secretary of Transportation prioritizes and
allocates all modes of transportation and must be involved in
all CRAF activations. [Ref. 25:pp. 13, 14]
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F. CRAF PARTICIPANTS
No legislative basis exists with respect to the CRAF
program, in that the civilian airline industry is required to
participate in the CRAF. The MAC/CRAF relationship depends
primarily upon airline industry cooperation since
participation is voluntary. Consequently, the DOD is very
interested in the financial well-being of the airlines,
especially those providing cargo carriers to the CRAF. Table
4 shows the carriers providing CRAF aircraft. [Ref. 27:p.
34]
TABLE 4
CARRIERS PARTICIPATING IN THE CRAF









































* Airlines providing cargo aircraft
** Joint Venture (refer to Section L)
*** Joint Venture
Source: Defense Transportation Journal, June 1987, p. 34
G. CRAF ASSETS
The number of CRAF aircraft varies each month according
to how many aircraft can be made available by the airlines.




CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET (CRAF)






^1 askan Segment _(_lll
L-100-30 3
DC-6 8
Sho r t - range_ International Segment (13)
"87 2 7 ... .7 13










.... 3 ... .
. . .19. . . .
. . .36. . . .
. . .16. . . .
... 0. . . .
0. . . .









Source: Defense Transportation Journal, June 1987, p. 33
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CRAF airlift capabilities include the Boeing 747 (99
tons of cargo or 419 passengers), the McDonnell Douglas DC-10
(70 tons of cargo or 359 passengers), the Lockheed L-1011
(274 passengers), the Boeing 707 (30 tons or 149
passengers ), and the McDonnell Douglas DC-8 (41 tons or 264
passengers). [Ref. 28:p. 6]
As of November 1986, there were 307 long-range aircraft
assigned to the CRAF. Of that total, only 74 were cargo
carriers. Five years ago, there were 126 freighters in the
CRAF. The decline is due to a weakening air cargo industry.
Noise abatement regulations forced the grounding of many 707s
and DC-Ss (those still operating were re-engined). Also,
wide-body passenger aircraft with substantial cargo-carrying
capacity in the belly space have posed significant
competition. [Ref. 23:p. 40]
H. CRAF ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM
To maximize available assets and future aircraft
resources, the MAC implemented the CRAF enhancement program.
The program is designed to increase oversized cargo lift
capabilities of large aircraft such as the B747, DC-10, and
L-1011. As currently configured, existing cargo carriers
cannot accommodate outsized or oversized cargo. [Ref.
25.
-p. 14] Oversize cargo has dimensions exceeding 104 inches
in length and 84 inches in width and cannot be palletized.
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Outsized cargo has dimensions exceeding 828 inches in length,
117 inches in width, or 105 inches in height. Oversized
cargo can be transported in the C-141, C-130, and commercial
wide-bodied aircraft, excluding the Boeing 707 and the DC-8.
[Ref. 29:p. 44] Depending upon contract specifications, the
U. S. government reimburses the carrier for the higher costs
in operating these heavier aircraft as well as for lost
revenue while the aircraft is being modified. The
modifications include the installation of a cargo door in the
fuselage and a strengthened floor, in addition to cargo
handling equipment. [Ref. 25:p. 14, 15]
,,/ To date, the contracts outlined in Table 6 are in effect
with respect to the aircraft enhancement program:
TABLE 6
CRAF ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM CONTRACTS
AArl^ine Contract Cost per Contract Del^i^verY Delivery; No_^
l§^2!th £i.ane type source date a/c
United 16 yrs $15. 8M restrict* prod. 1982 1
line DC-lOlO
PANAM 12 yrs $30M restrict existing JUN 85- 19
a/c APR 89 B747s
FEDEXP 16 yrs $4.3M non- prod. SEP 87 1
restrict* line DC-1030
* Per public law, restrictive contracts do not allow use
of main cargo deck for commercial services. Government pays
for modification, weight penalties (cost of operating heavier





** Unrestrictive contracts allow use of main deck for
cargo features for commercial use. Government is limited to
not more than one-half of modification costs. The airline is
responsible for the remaining cost plus any out of service
and weight penalties.
Source: MAJ Randy Durham, CRAF Action Officer, Headquarters
MAC/XPW, Scott AFB, IL, AV-576-6751
I . MAC/AIRLINE INDUSTRY CONTRACTUAL PROCEDURES
The MAC annually defines its mission requirements and
contracts with U.S. commercial carriers for CRAF aircraft and
air crews. The MAC submits requirements to the Department of
Transportation (DOT) through the DOD . The Office of
Emergency Transportation assigns CRAF aircraft to the stages
by carrier and aircraft registration. [Ref. 25:p. 13]
Mission requirements and civil contracts are funded through
the Airlift Services Industrial Fund (ASIF). Hence, the
military services reimburse MAC for transportation services
on the basis of tariffs which are periodically revised to
adjust for a breakeven position on revenues and expenses.
[Ref. 30]
In exchange for making their planes available, the
carriers are awarded a percentage of MAC ' s peacetime
passenger and cargo business. How much business is awarded
depends on the mobilization value of the carrier's specific
aircraft. Currently, wide-body cargo planes or
cargo-convertible planes are needed most by the Air Force, so
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the mobilization value (which is based upon cargo carrying
capacity) of those planes is high. For example, a carrier
with a passenger-only 747 might have a value of one, while a
carrier with a cargo 747 might have a value of four. If
there is $500,000 worth of contracts available, the first
carrier will receive a $100,000 contract, and the second
carrier will receive a $400,000 contract. [Ref. 23:p. 39]
Carriers are guaranteed airlift contracts based on their
mobilization values; however, they must earn at least 60% of
their total revenue from other sources or lose DOD
allocations. This discourages "pure DOD carriers" and
encourages U. S. air fleet growth [Ref. 31 :p. 24]
However, a major problem exists: less than 50% of the
DOD users have been able to identify their long-range cargo
requirements in time for the annual solicitation of fixed
entitlements. Consequently, the airline industry is seeking
other industry contracts. MAC has short-term cargo
requirements, but the airline industry isn't interested in
tying up their assets for part-time work. Per the CRAF
Action Officer at MAC Headquarters, "We're working on it."
[Ref. 32]
Clearly, CRAF participation is predicted upon what is
occurring in the airline industry. Therefore, before
discussing the current problems with the CRAF program, a
brief overview of the pre-deregulation environment as well as
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deregulation and its general impact on the airline industry
and the CRAF in particular is required.
J. PRE-DEREGULATION ENVIRONMENT
The Federal Government regulated the airline industry
until 1978. During this period, the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) approved air routes and insured transportation in the
majority of the United States. The CAB protected the
financial health of carriers and encouraged airlines to
participate in the CRAF program. [Ref. 25:p, 15]
When an airline requested an additional long distance
route, the CAB would approve the request with the stipulation
that the airline also operate flights in smaller, less
lucrative areas. In addition, the CAB monitored the
Essential Air Service ( EAS ) program whereas ^he government
subsidized air service to small communities where traffic
volume precluded carrier profit. The EAS is scheduled to
terminate in 1988. [Ref. 25:p. 16]
Fares charged by carriers were regulated, also. Long
distance flights were extremely profitable; thus, long range
aircraft were abundant and a lesser number of smaller
aircraft existed. The long range aircraft are most essential
to the CRAF. [Ref. 25: p. 16]
During this time, the concern of the airline industry was
the amount of COD peacetime cargo allocated to the CRAF. In
May 1971, Senator Warren Magnuson (D, WA) introduced Senate
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Bill 1821, requesting a 50% share of DOD peacetime cargo for
CRAF civil carriers. The House Committee on Commerce passed
the bill but reduced the 50% allocation to 40%. No
congressional action resulted, and subsequent bills
were introduced in the House and Senate (H.R. 5085 and S.
1350) . A mandatory amount of DOD cargo for air carriers was
again established. This time the House bill set a 50%
allocation; the Senate required 40%. However, final
Congressional action was not taken to enact either bill into
law. Starting in 1973 (primarily in response to the American
withdrawal from Vietnam) , total DOD cargo airlift
requirements decreased. Commercial air carriers attempted to
gain a larger share of the available cargo, but to no avail.
[Ref. 33:pp. 81-83]
K. DEREGULATION
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 abolished the CAB,
and granted airlines free entry/exit into the marketplace.
From 1978 to 1984, the number of certificated airlines in the
U.S. grew from 44 to 114. With a few exceptions, the new
airlines, using non-union employees and cheaper, used
aircraft, provided service between cities located only
hundreds of miles apart. They established themselves in a
limited market and gradually expanded their route structureas
business and profit allowed. A "hub" system evolved whereby
passengers were flown to a central base of operations and
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then flown to the ultimate destination. This system
optimized the use of smaller, more fuel efficient aircraft
(DC-9s/737s) to transport passengers to a certain location
and larger aircraft from the hub to the final destination.
People Express perfected the concept (though it did not
prevent it from financial insolvency) , and most of the
airline industry use this method today. [Ref. 25:pp. 16, 17]
DOD ' s attitude toward deregulation was passive, relying
primarily on the free market system to sustain sufficient
strategic airlift capability. The failure of an airline was
of no concern: another would take its place. DOD ' s attitude
was that the CRAF aircraft would remain under one airline or
another. The end result, however, was that total long-range
capability declined from 16.238 mtm/d (May 1982) to 9.86
mtm/d (December 1986). A significant portion of the decline
was a result of noise abatement regulations. [Ref. 27 :p. 34]
L. POST-DEREGULATION ENVIRONMENT
Since deregulation, specific problem areas have surfaced
with respect to the financial stability of the airline
industry and the ASIF, unrealistic strategic airlift
requirements, and the failure to convince major airlines to
add defense features to their planes. A discussion of each
area follows:
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1 . l!AIl^cial_StabiIitY of the^Airline
a. Mergers/Consolidations/Discontinued Operations.
(1) In 1986; Texas Air merged with Eastern, People
Express, and Frontier. As a result, Texas Air
became the largest airline, controlling almost
20% of the scheduled passenger market. [Ref.
27:p. 33]
(2) When United purchased Pan Am ' s Pacific
Division, it became the second largest with a
16% market share. [Ref. 27:p. 33]
(3) American Airlines controls 13% of the market,
making it the third largest airline. Its
internal growth started initially by adding new
flights, hubs, and lower paid workers, then
moved to purchase AirCal. Delta's take-over of
Western gave it an 11% market share, and the
TWA/Ozark merger gave TWA a 9% market share.
[Ref. 27:p. 33]
(4) Pan Am is ranked 6th with a 7% market share,
and US Air is ranked 7th with a 3% market
share. [Ref.27:p. 33]
(5) Pan Am and American Airlines ceased cargo
operations in 1983 [Ref. 23:p. 40]. Pan Am is
viewed as a prime takeover candidate, as a
result of significant losses. World Airlines
ceased scheduled service in September 1986.
[Ref. 27:pp. 33, 34] Trans America, the third
largest GRAF carrier, ceased operations in
1986, reducing GRAF mtm/d capacity by .8.
[Ref. 23:p. 40]
(6) Flying Tiger, the largest GRAF contract and the
world's largest and oldest international air
cargo firm, announced in November 1986 it would
liquidate unless certain concessions were made
by its employees. These have been made, and
Flying Tiger's financial status seems to be
improving. [Ref. 23:p. 40]
b. Overnight Package Deliver Business Expansion.
Although this business expanded rapidly, it hasn't filled the
void left by the decline of the air cargo business. First,
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the package carriers' aircraft aren't constructed to carry
heavy cargo. Although UPS has purchased narrow-bodied 757s,
the floors aren't sturdy enough to carry military cargo
pallets. Second, these carriers are concerned about the
competitive disadvantages should their planes be activated.
Their fleets are relatively small and competition is fierce.
The activation of 10 planes, for example, could adversely
affect their operations. [Ref. 23:pp. 40, 41]
The third reason involves the regulations for
entrance into CRAF. For example, four crews must be assigned
to each plane, and CRAF participants have to be certified air
carriers. These carriers don't have the manpower to dedicate
four crews to each plane. Also, air carriers using leased
planes aren't considered certified. Most aircraft in the
package carrier business are leased. [Ref. 23:p. 41]
Both Emery and UPS are competing with Federal
Express and DHL International in the European market.
However, it appears a shake-out is forthcoming. As number
one. Federal Express controls over 50% of the market share.
UPS follows with approximately 16%. Burlington, Emery,
Purolator, Airborne, and DHL each have a smaller shares of
the market but tough price-cutting and competition are
increasing the chances of consolidations among this segment
of the airline industry as well. [Ref. 27:p. 33]
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c. International Arena.
The airline industry has suffered in the
international market as well. Terrorist attacks in Europe
and the Middle East, coupled with the nuclear accident in the
Soviet Union, have adversely affected summertime travel. Pan
Am and TWA, with primary markets in Europe, suffered losses
of $276 million and $257 m.illion, respectively, in the first
six months of 1986. [Ref. 27:p.33]
2 • Financial Stability of the Airlif t_Servj,ce
Industrial Fund (ASIF)
MAC mission requirements and civil contracts are
funded through the ASIF. This revolving fund was established
with an initial working capital of $75 million (known as the
"corpus") in FY 1959 and has grown to where the financial
operations approximate $2 billion. [Ref. 30]
Basically, the ASIF is structured the same as any
commercial enterprise. The initial capitalization finances
operating expenses resulting from the airlift services
provided to its users (Army, Navy, and Air Force). The users
are billed for the services and reimburse the ASIF. [Ref. 30]
The key to success in any industrial fund
environment is to have the tariff rates close to the cost to
buy the service. Tariff rates are established approximately
nine months prior to a fiscal year and are computed by
dividing estimated expenses by estimated ton miles. Due to
an "arbitrary" reduction by the Office of the Secretary of
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Defense of $125 million per year and losses due to increased
transportation costs in the civil sector (only recovering 85°^
of each dollar spent), the ASIF is projected to be insolvent
by February 1983. The currer.t balance of the corpus is $40
million. The "arbitrary" program budget decisions were
reclamaed in December 1986 to Deputy Defense Secretary
William H. Taft IV and denied. [Ref. 30] An interesting
sideline: In the fall of the 1986, Secretary Taft told the
National Defense Transportation Association conference,
"After 34 successful years, the CRAF program is facing severe
problems. We are losing CRAF capabilities, and we have not
been able to replace them" [Ref. 23 :p. 40]. Maybe the
approval of addition funding would help to replace the
assets! The Assistant Secretary of Defense Comptroller was
briefed on the ASIF status in October 1987. Speculation at
this point is that funds within DOD will be reprogrammed to
keep the fund afloat. After that, the future of the ASIF is
unknown. [Ref. 30]
3 . Unrealistic Strategic Lift Reguiremgnts
As previously stated, a 66 mtm/d strategic airlift
requirement was established by the 1981 Congress ional ly
Mandated Mobility Study. To attain this, the Air Force's
Master Plan established a 14 mtm/d requirement for the CRAF
by the mid-1990s. CRAF is projected to meet that goal even
with the current situation. The 66 mtm/d requirement,
however, is viewed as unrealistic. Per the Air Assistant in
the Pentagon's transportation office, the baseline on the
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smallest scenario is 85 mtm/d. Given this, it appears that
the CRAF would have to provide a minimum of 20 mtm/d. If the
current trends continue, however, CRAF ' s capacity will fall
to about 10 mtm/d by the year 2000. [Ref. 23:pp. 39, 40]
4 . Defense Features
Airlines, with the exception of those listed in Table
5, have shown little interest in purchasing wide-body
aircraft equipped with defense features. The primary reasons
for this lack of interest are;
(1) The airlines are concerned that aircraft
activation will reduce their competitive edge
(their competitors will still be flying). MAC
is reviewing the CRAF activation system to
-
' determine an equitable method. The major
airline consolidations that are occurring may
present away to do this since, at some point,
there may be only six to seven major airlines.
Therefore, the problem of activating ten
aircraft, for example, from a small airline and
economically crippling it will be eliminated.
This, however, doesn't solve the problem of
CRAF aircraft activated from the international
market, where foreign airlines could feasibly
have routes to themselves. [Ref. 23 :p. 42]
(2) Service to key international routes will be
limited due to the increased weight imposed by
the defense features (10,000 - 20,000 lbs). It
would be impossible to fly non-stop,
international routes with the added weight;
consequently, the carriers would not be
competitive in the international market. The
route limitations concern is still under study.
Major growth is occurring in the non-stop Asian
market: aircraft with defense features cannot
compete on a non-stop route. [Ref. 23:p. 42]
(3) No compensation exists to offset the risk of
competitive harm, range limitations due to
additional weight, and the probable low resale
value of the aircraft. These concerns are
difficult, if not impossible, to quantify
unlike the funding for the installation of
defense features and subsequent operating
costs. [Ref. 23:p. 42]
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defense features and subsequent operating
costs. [Ref. 23:p. 42]
M. MAC'S SOLUTIONS
To address some of the problems v;ith respect to GRAF, the
MAC relaxed the CRAF entrance requirements and established
the joint venture program in 1986 (FY 87) which opened the
CRAF to operators and/or carriers previously excluded. In
the event of an activation, joint venture firms' aircraft and
crews are combined as a single entity with an existing CRAF
participant. This has enabled MAC to utilize the significant
cargo fleet of an overnight parcel company such as UPS.
However, Flying Tiger's financial problems may end one of
mac's joint ventures. Furthermore, Flying Tiger's airlift
capability to the CRAF is lost unless another CRAF carrier
buys Flying Tiger's aircraft. Since most airlines are
exiting from the cargo business, and overnight package
operators may undergo a major shakeout in the future, the
sustained inventory of freight aircraft seems doubtful.
[Ref. 27:p. 34]
Additionally, MAC is projected to propose changes with
respect to the CRAF program. If the changes are made, they
will help CRAF meet its 14 mtm/d requirements. To reverse
the decline in the CRAF, major airlines must be recruited.
If all the aircraft scheduled for production were built with
defense features, CRAF capability would be 30 mtm/d. [Ref.
23:p. 41]
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Some officials, including MAC ' s assistant for civil air,
think more money is the answer. This, however, may be viewed
as subsidizing the airlines. Says the current Air Assistant
in the Pentagon's transportation office, "The policy of this
administration is straight forward: We're not in the
business to subsidize; we're in the business to incentivize"
[Ref. 23:p. 42]. The airlines' concerns are DOD ' s concerns
because the existing shortfall in cargo airlift capacity
could be alleviated with the projected purchase of 274
wide-body aircraft from 1987-1994. These aircraft could add
approximately 16 mtm/d to CRAF by 1995; however,
modifications are necessary to meet DOD/MAC airlift
requirements. [Ref. 23:pp. 37, 38, 41]
It appears that legislation mandating defense features is
forthcoming. A heated debate is sure to follow. MAC sees it
as the airline's duty for the good of the country; the
airlines see it as government control. Shades of regulation,
again? [Ref. 23:p. 55]
N. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, the primary problems with the CRAF program
are
:
1. A shrinking air cargo industry.
2. The lack of compensation to the airlines to
offset the risks of competitive harm, range
limitations due to additional weight, and
probable low resale value of the aircraft for
installing defense features. As already stated,
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this is difficult, if not, impossible to
quantify.
3. mac's inability to project long-range cargo
requirements. Less than 50% of the users have
been able to identify their requirements in time
for the annual solicitation for fixed
entitlements. MAC is working to resolve this
problem
.
4. Stringent CRAF entrance requirements into the
program. MAC has relaxed some of the
requirements and others are being reviewed.
5. ASIF funding shortfall. Future of the fund is
pending resolution by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense Comptroller.
The future of the CRAF needs to be comprehensively
evaluated. The CRAF enhancement program and the joint
ventures will add additional capability to the CRAF. However,
they won't ensure sustained strategic airlift capabilities.
It is projected that 2056 of the Western Hemisphere's jet
aircraft fleet will be on short-term leases by 1991, due to
tax law changes, consolidations, and market forces. This
gives the airlines significant flexibility in changing types
of aircraft to meet supply and demand and further destabilize
the CRAF. Additionally, the major airline leasing company
isin Ireland. Foreign flag aircraft are excluded from CRAF.
[Ref. 27:p. 34]
Some options available to DOD/MAC are:
1. Purchase and store freighters for future
activation. This parallels the Navy's Ready
Reserve Force [Ref. 27: p. 35].
2. Mandate the installation of defense features to
existing and production aircraft (government
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funded) . This is viewed by some as the only way
to get airline industry participation [Ref. 23:p.
38] .
Provide additional incentives in the form of
increased cargo contracts to the civil sector.
Currently, DOD provides $1 billion worth of
business each year into a $50 billion per year
industry. Currently, MAC is trying to determine
the impact of increasing the $1 billion to $2-3
billion. Although the DOD only accounts for 2%
of the airline industry business, it is the
largest customer of the airline industry, giving
it a lot of leverage to negotiate [Ref. 23:p.39].
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IV . MILITARY TRAFF I C MANAGEMENT _C0MMAND_1MTMCJ.
A. INTRODUCTION
The Military Transportation Management Command ( MTMC ) is
the first leg of the strategic transportation triad. It is a
jointly staffed, industrially funded, major Army Command
through which the Secretary of the Army carries out
single manager responsibilities for the management of
military traffic, land transportation, and common user
ocean terminals in the Continental United States (CONUS)
and selected overseas areas. [Ref. l:p. 101]
MTMC manages the transportation of personnel, equipment,
and supplies throughout CONUS to MAC'S aircraft, MSC ' s ships,
or to commercial overseas carriers. To provide these
services to all of DOD, MTMC functions as a transportation
manager, operator, advisor, and engineer. [Ref. 34:p. 28]
This chapter will focus on MTMC ' S role as a
transportation manager. Specifically, the MTMC ' s operation
of the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet (DFRIF) will
be addressed
.
Clinton H, Whitehurst, Jr., in his book, The Defense
Transportation: Competitor or Complement to the Private
Sector?, questioned the need for DOD-owned rail assets. The
question was posed again by Deputy Defense Secretary Taft
during the Army's FY 88-92 Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
submission. As a result of Secretary Taft's inquiries, the
Army's POM submission for railcar procurement was cancelled
and a DFRIF study was initiated to explore the feasibility of
utilizing private sector assets to meet strategic mobility
requirements. [Ref. 35:p. ES-1]
This chapter will address the following questions
regarding the DFRIF as well as provide a brief history of the
MTMC:
1. What is the rationale behind DOD-owned rail
assets?
2. Can industry meet DOD peacetime and mobilization
requirements by purchasing DOD railcars and
leasing them back?
3. What is the feasibility of instituting a CRAF-type
program for rail?
B. MTMC HISTORY
The DOD transportation structure was reviewed in 1944.
Although consolidation of the services was strongly
recommended, the timing of the proposed change (during World
War II) was deemed poor. Post-war reconsideration resulted
in the National Security Act of 1947. [Ref. l:p. 102]
The Act directed that the Secretary of Defense eliminate
unnecessary duplication in the areas of procurement, supply,
transportation, storage, health and research. Merging the
services into one organization or radically changing service
missions was not the intent of the Act. There were many
advocates of a single service; however, the benefits of
efficiency and economy could be optimized through common or
cross-servicing arrangements between interdependent, unified
services. Unification efforts relating to land
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transportation and traffic management functions are reviewed
next. [Ref. l-.p. 102]
Lessons learned from World War II indicated that military
transportation activities needed to be structured to maximize
efficiency and effectiveness. Duplication of effort was
commonplace in the traffic management, port operations , and
sea and air transport activities. Although the establishment
of coordinating agencies and cooperation of the military
services minimized this somewhat during the war, duplication
continued throughout the DOD transportation arena. [Ref.
l:pp. 103, 104]
The first step to eliminate unnecessary duplication of
effort was the assignment of transportation by service: air,
land, and sea were assigned to the most qualified military
service. Air transport went to the Air Force; sea transport
to the Navy; and land transport to the Army. As a result,
the Air Force and Navy Military Air Transport Service (MATS)
was established in 1948, ultimately becoming the Military
Airlift Command (MAC) in 1966. In 1949, the Army and Navy
ocean shipping responsibilities were combined under the
auspices of the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS)
(later renamed the Military Sealift Command (MSC)) to provide
ocean carrier service for the three military services.
Unified airlift and sealift services were attained, and
unnecessary duplications in military transportation were
reduced. [Ref. 1
:
pp . 104, 105]
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The unification of land transportation was a slower
process. Other military services resisted traffic management
consolidation under the Army because traffic management and
the supply mission of each service were thought to be
inseparable. To alleviate the problem somewhat, the
Secretary of Defense established the Military Traffic Service
(MTS) in 1950 to provide regulatory guidance for the
underlying problem: the continued duplication of
transportation services and traffic management operations.
Constant review of the problem gained more support for the
consolidation of land transportation functions. For example,
overseas commanders were authorized to designate the Army
responsible for all land and related transportation matters.
[Ref. l:pp. 105, 106]
By the end of the Korean Conflict, no unified traffic
management service existed comparable to MATS and MSTS
.
However, by 1955, the single manager concept for land
transportation and traffic management was developed,
[Ref.l:p. 107]
The Single Manager Plan was a concept whereby the
Secretary of one military department was designated by
SECDEF as a Single Manager responsible for the
performance of all management functions related to a
specified common user item or service for all
departments. This concept was applied to the Secretary of
the Army in 1956 for traffic management within CONUS
[Ref. l:p. 108]
As a result of a Secretary of Defense-directed
interservice study of tb.e CONUS air and ocean terminal
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system, the Secretary of the Army was designated as the
Single Manager for Military Traffic, Land Transportation, and
Common-user Ocean Terminals, which he delegated to the
Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS).
MTMTS was redesignated as the Military Traffic Management
Command { MTMC ) in 1974. [Ref. 1
:
pp . 113, 114]
C. DEFENSE FREIGHT RAILWAY INTERCHANGE FLEET (DFRIF)
As the Single Manager for military traffic, land
transportation and common-user ocean terminals, MTMC is
responsible for the control and operation of all DOD owned
railway interchange assets. " The Secretary of the Army and
the MTMC, as the Executive Agent, plan, program and budget
for the acquisition, modification, and maintenance of DFRIF
equipment" [Ref. 35 :p. 1].
DFRIF assets are comprised of railcars needed to support
a full mobilization which aren't readily available from tb.e
civil rail industry such as heavy duty flatcars and rail cars
not supplied by the railroads (tank cars and depressed center
flatcars to support the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program)
.




as of May 1987
TANK CARS GP lOK (FUELS) 761
TANK CARS GP 20K (FUELS) 283
TANK CARS SP 20K ( MULTICHEMICALS ) 60
TANK CARS SP lOK (MULTICHEMICALS) 81
BOXCARS END DOOR 70-TON 30
REFRIGERATOR CARS
(TRIDENT II MOTORS) . . . .70-TON 2
FLATCARS 140-TON CHAIN TIE DOWNS 569
FLATCARS 100-TON (PAX TRUCKS) 98
FLATCARS lOO-TON 570
FLATCARS 80-TON 147




FLATCARS 200-TON WELL 3
FLATCARS 1 35-TON WELL 1
FLATCARS 90-TON WELL 4
FLATCARS ESCORT 6
FLATCARS ESCORT 5
TOTAL 2 , 683
FLATCARS IN-LEASED IN SUPPORT OF TITAN II 11
GRANDTOTAL 2 , 694
Source: DFRIF Study, MTMC , Directorate of Inland Traffic,
Washington D.C., June 1987
MTMC-sponsored studies are conducted to determine
peacetime and mobilization shipping requirements. These
studies also analyze the strategic potential of commercial
transportation assets, DFRIF car utilization goals, the
projected economic life of new equipment, and the most
cost-effective method to procure DFRIF equipment. [Ref. 35: p.
1]
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The last study, conducted in 1984, indicated that 209
additional 20 , 000-gal Ion general purpose tank cars and 123
additional 140-ton flatcars were required. The study
indicated that buying the additional assets was more
cost-effective than any other method of procurement. [Ref.
35 :p. 2]
The DFRIF is comprised of primarily flatcars and tankcars
(90%); consequently, the study only evaluated these types of
cars. Also, all DFRIF 80- and 100-ton flatcars and most of
the 10 , 000-gal Ion general purpose tank cars must be retired
by 1994. The Association of American Railroad (AAR)
Interchange Rules mandate retirement at 41 years of age.
Therefore, only the DFRIF 's newest 140-ton general purpose
flatcars (569 total) and 20 , 000-gal Ion tank cars (283 total)
will be addressed in this chapter. [Ref. 35:p. 2] DOD '
s
short- and long-term railcar requirements will not be
addressed, as this will be Part II of the DFRIF Study which
is scheduled to be completed November 1987. [Ref, 35:p. 2]
D. HEAVY DUTY FLATCARS
DOD owns heavy duty flatcars to ensure contingency
readiness. MTMC decisions to purchase heavy lift flatcars
were based on the following:
1. DOD must be able to respond quickly in a contingency.
2
.
Loading of heavy tracked vehicles such as Ml tanks
will begin at early deploying installations just




3. Little advanced warning prior to Mobilization Day
will be provided to installations or industry.
4. Industry cannot effectively respond to a contingency
with commercial assets until M+6 days, i.e., the
seventh day of the mobilization. This response time
is based on industry estimates and experience gained
from military exercises [Ref. 35:p. 4].
DOD ' s purchase of the 569 140-ton chain tie-down flatcars
were based on the following:
1. All 80- and 100-ton flatcars currently in the
DFRIF must be mandatorily retired by 1994.
2. Under the Department of the Army's Force
Modernization Plan, all M60 tanks will be
replaced by larger, heavier Ml tanks.
3. Effective fielding of the Ml tank, subsequent
tank modification and repair requirements, and
military exercises will require significant
peacetime railcar support.
4. Two Ml tanks can be loaded on a 140-ton flatcar
with chain tie-down devices and secured without
any blocking and bracing. Use of 140-ton
flatcars will result in reduced costs and
operational efficiencies.
5. The railroads have few flatcars capable of
transporting two Ml tanks and, for economic
reasons, are reducing the overall number of heavy
duty flatcars in their fleets.
6. Prior to seeking funds for the initial purchase
of 140- ton flatcars, MTMC met with the
Association of American Railroad's Operating
Transportation General Committee, composed of
chief operating officers of the various major
railroads. The purpose of this meeting was to
inform the railroads of DOD ' s need for heavy duty
flatcars capable of transporting two Ml tanks and
to determine their interest in providing such
cars Because of the limited commercial
application of these cars and the somewhat
sporadic requirements of DOD, it was determined
that an investment by the railroads of this
nature was not justified [Ref. 35:pp. 4, 5].
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The depressed railcar building industry enabled DOD to
procure the 569 140-ton flatcars at outstanding prices from
three contractors. The first 101 cars were bought for
$118,000 per car in FY 81. The next 144 cars were purchased
in FY 82 for $97,153 per car, and the last purchase for 324
cars in FY 85 was for $85,298 per car. [Ref. 35:p. 5]
E. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
1 . Finding I
The 569 140-ton flatcars owned by DOD are required to
meet DOD ' s peacetime and contingency railcar requirements
[Ref . 35 :p. 5]
.
Utilization of the 569 flat cars is as follows:
(1) One hundred and forty-nine are allocated for
requisite peacetime needs. One hundred and
fourteen are specifically allocated to the Ml
tank program (production, fielding,
modification, and repairs) . From FY 87 to FY
90, over 2,800 MlAl tanks will be produced
and transported to continental United States
(CONUS) installations and ports. Also,
during that timeframe, approximately 1,100
tanks will be,: returned from overseas
installations. The commercial industry does
not have flatcars to support these efforts
(two Ml tanks per f latcar-explained in
Finding 2). The remaining 35 cars support
miscellaneous peacetime requirements,
travelling 135, 116 loaded miles during FY
86. [Ref. 35:p. 5]
(2) Four hundred and twenty of the flatcars
support Strategic (STRAT) Pool requirements
consisting of heavy lift needs of early
deploying units within CONUS. The flatcars
are preposi t ioned and projected to satisfy
the strategic lift requirements of the first
seven days of a contingency. Afterwards,
commercial assets and returning DFRIF
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equipment will be utilized. To satisfy DOD '
s
early deployment requirements, MTMC
established aminimum baseline of 420 cars.
[Ref. 35:pp. 5, 6]
2. Finding 2
Transporting tv;o Ml tanks on one flatcar with chain
tie-downs results in transportation and transportation-
related cost savings and operational efficiencies [Ref. 35:p,
6] .
Transporting two tanks on a rail flatcar is more
cost-effective than transporting one. Since chain tie-down
equipment can be reused, standard blocking and bracing
materials are unnecessary. In terms of operation
effectiveness, deployment time and manpower requirements are




Industry has few heavy duty flatcars capable of
transporting two Ml tanks. Further, industry's overall heavy
duty railcar fleet has drastically declined over the past 10
years and is expected to decline further in the future [Ref.
35 :p. 6]
.
In a 1987 Government Accounting Office ( GAO ) report
entitled, "Deployment: Better Determination of Army
Transportation Requirements is Needed," GAO indicated that
only 107 industry-owned flatcars were available that could
transport two Ml tanks. Additionally, GAO ' s report indicated
that a 20% decline had occurred since 1983 in the inventory
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of flatcars able to transport track vehicles. The
commercially-owned flatcars capable of transporting DOD track
vehicles were purchased initially for requirements within the
farm machinery industry. This industry has deteriorated
along with the flatcars. Over the past 10 years,
container izat ion and the use of double stack cars has been
the industry trend; consequently, a negligible number of
flatcars have been built. According to AAR statistics, the
industry has procured 204 new flatcars over the past 10 years
while 14,405 have been retired. The American Railway Car
Institute indicates this trend will continue. [Ref. 35:pp.
6,7]
4. Finding 4
Industry is not interested in purchasing DOD ' s
140-ton flatcars without a lease back provision. With this
provision, industry is only minimally interested in
purchasing DOD ' s 140-ton flatcars [Ref. 35:p. 7].
Based on a meeting between the MTMC , the AAR, and
various commercial car management-car leasing company
officials and subsequent DOD solicitations, no companies
responded favorably with respect to procuring the 140-ton
flatcars. The option of buying with a lease back provision
was favorably received by only one company. [Ref. 35 :p. 7]
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F. ALTERNATIVES
1 . Status Quo
Under this alternative, DOD would continue to own and
control the 569 140-ton flatcars. The current market value
of the flatcars is $47 million. FY 86 DFRIF administrative
costs were $790,563 (civil service labor and benefits,
materials and supplies, travel, office space, telephone and
ADP support), of which $165,509 ($291 per car) was attributed
to the 140-ton flatcars. Contingency readiness, significant
transportation cost reductions, operational efficiencies, and
mileage received from the railroads are the primary benefits
of the status quo alternative. [Ref. 35:pp. 7, 8]
Minimal risks are involved with the status quo; DOD
can meet strategic contingency and peacetime requirements in
a timely, efficient manner. [Ref. 35:p. 9]
2 • Ssll and_Lease_Back
With this alternative, MTMC would contract with and
sell the 140-ton flatcars to a leasing company and then lease
them back. The private sector would own the cars, but MTMC
would maintain operational and maintenance responsibilities
and mileage revenues. One proposal was received with an
opportunity cost of capital to DOD of more than $591 million.
The status quo alternative is preferable economically.
[Ref.35:p. 9]
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3 • Sell Wlthouta Lease Back_Provislon
This alternative has the railroad industry meeting
DOD heavy lift flatcar requirements. No companies, however,
were interested. Also, this alternative carries a high
degree of risk since the industry doesn't have an adequate
railcar inventory capable of transporting two Ml tanks and
given the demise of commercially-owned flatcars in general.
[Ref. 35:p. 10]
4 . Scrap_and Re ].Y_on Industry
This alternative represents the same risks as D.3.
above and, therefore, is undesirable. [Ref, 35:p. 10]
5 • Sell and Lease Back Under a Contingency Contract
Under this alternative, DOD sells the flatcars,
leases those required to meet peacetime requirements, with a
guarantee that the remaining inventory would be on standby in
the event of a national emergency. This alternative is being
further explored with Greyhound Financial Corporation, the
only company which responded, and will be addressed in Part
II of the DFRIF study. [Ref. 35:pp. 10, 11]
G. TANK CARS
Tank cars must be provided by the shipper; consequently,
DOD must have an inventory of these cars to receive
economically advantageous railroad freight rates. [Ref,
35:p. 15]
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DFRIF tank cars are used primarily by the Defense
Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) (227 of the 283 20 , 000-gal Ion
general purpose tank cars). DFSC-purchased fuel is
transported from major suppliers to DOD-owned or -leased
distribution centers. Without DFRIF tank cars, DFSC would
have to use high cost modes of transportation. [Ref. 35:p.
15]
Initially, bulk liquids were transported in 10 , 000-gallon
DOD tank cars. In 1976, 162 20 , 000-gallon cars were procured
and in 1978/79, 119 20 , 000-gallon special purpose cars were
converted from acid to petroleum use. In 1986, two more were
converted resulting in a current inventory of
28320 , 000-gallon cars. These actions were based on the
following DOD considerations:
1. DOD will continue to experience requirements for
tank cars in the future.
2. All existing 10 , 000-gal Ion tank cars reach their
40-year life and must be mandatorily retired from
interchange service by FY 95.
3. Use of 20 , 000-gallon cars results in lower
freight costs.
4. Procurement versus leasing of the 20 , 000-gallon
cars is the most cost effective method of
acquisition [Ref. 35:pp. 15, 16].
H. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
1 . Finding 1
All 283 20 , 000-gal Ion general purpose tank cars
currently owned by DOD are required to meet DOD ' s peacetime
railcar requirements [Ref. 35:p. 16].
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As stated above, DFSC utilizes 227 of the 284
20 , 000-gallon cars. The remaining 56 cars are allocated to
the Department of the Air Force, Air Logistics Command, for
transportation of special fuels from refineries. All of the
DOD-owned tanks cars averaged 11.7 trips per car in 1986,
well above the six trips per year for the industry standard.
[Ref. 35:p. 16]
2. Finding 2
The railroads do not provide shippers with tank cars
and will not do so in the future [Ref. 35:p. 16].
As a matter of practice, the rail industry does not
provide shippers with tank cars. "The federal courts have
historically considered tank cars as not only a car but a
package for the goods which must have special mechanical
means of loading and unloading" [Ref. 35:p. 15]
Consequently, the system consists of private ownership of
tank cars. AAR representatives indicate this practice will
remain as is. [Ref. 35:p. 16]
3- Finding 3
Industry is not interested in unconditionally
purchasing DOD ' s 20 , 000-gal Ion tank cars and only minimally
interested in purchasing them with a lease back provision.
Industry is interested in leasing to DOD additional tank cars
{ 20 , 000-gallon and/or greater capacity cars) to meet future
requirements [Ref. 35:p. 16].
79
Industry is uninterested in procuring DOD '
s
20 , 000-gallon tank cars without a lease back provision. They
have no use for the 20 , 000-gallon cars since the
23 , 500-gal Ion capacity car is today's preferred car. Plus,
certain 20 , 000-gal Ion tank cars are over abundant in the




Tank cars with capacities greater than 20 , 000-gal Ions
have limited application in meeting DOD ' s tank car
requirements [Ref. 35:p. 17].
Of 20 military installations receiving fuel shipments
in tank cars, only nine indicated they could not receive
shipments in excess of 23,000. But, these nine receive
approximately 68% of the fuel being transported. [Ref. 35 :p.
17]
5 Finding 5
Ownership of tank cars allows DOD to transport
certain bulk fuel shipments at reduced costs and provides DOD
with operational flexibility. Delivery of bulk fuel
shipments in tank cars also helps sustain commercial rail
lines and rail receiving capabilities at DOD installations
[Ref. 35:p. 17]
.
From 1984 through 1986, DOD saved more than $1.5
million in transportation costs by using rail over motor.
"Also, use of tank cars in peacetime helps sustain commercial
rail lines and rail receiving capabilities at military
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installations. This ensures the availability of rail as an
alternate delivery mode in a contingency" [Ref. 35:p. 17]
Additionally, the tank cars can be used temporarily when




DOD would continue to own and control the 283
20 ; 000-gallon tank cars. The current market value for the
283 tank cars is $3,156,000. FY 86 administrative costs for
the 20 , 000-gallon general purpose tanks cars were
approximately $82, 353 ($291 per car). [Ref. 35:p. 18]
Operational and economic benefits result with the
status quo alternative and risks are minimal although there
is an uncertain long-term demand for tank cars. Future
shifts from rail to pipelines or other modes could reduce
tank car demand. If this occurs, the tank cars could be used
for intra-Army ammunition plants' or commercial use. [Ref.
35 :p. 19]
2 . Sell and Lease Back
Under this alternative, MTMC would contract with and
sell the tank cars to a leasing company and then lease them
back. MTMC would maintain operational and maintenance
responsibilities and mileage revenues. [Ref. 3:p. 19]
This alternative received one proposal which would
result in a compounded cost of capital to DOD of more than
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$20 million. Consequently, the status quo is economically
preferable. [Ref. 35:p. 19]
3 • Scrap_and_Lease Similar_Cars
This alternative would entail disposing of the 283
20 , 000-gallon tank cars. At the same time, DOD would lease
2S3 similar tanks cars, retaining operational and maintenance
responsibilities and railroad mileage allowances. [Ref. 35:p.
20]
The lowest cost estimate was for an ultimate total
cash outlay of $10 million. Again, it is economically
advantageous to stay with the status quo. [Ref. 35:p. 20]
4. Sell Without a Lease_Back_Provi^siqn
With this alternative, DOD would sell the cars to
commercial car leasing/car management companies, then lease
other, possible more modern tank cars. The sale would not be
contingent on a lease back provision. Companies were not
interested in this alternative, thus it is considered
infeasible. [Ref. 35:p, 20]
5 • Sell and Lease Back Larger Capacity Cars
Larger capacity cars aren't compatible with most DOD
fuel delivery requirements. One company was interested in
procuring the tank cars, provided DOD leased larger capacity
cars. No cost estimates were provided by the company, and
cost data wasn't requested due to the limited applicability
of the larger cars. However, significant interest was
demonstrated with respect to DOD leasing larger capacity cars
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should new requirements emerge. Since some installations can
accommodate larger capacity cars, this option will be
analyzed again in Part II of MTMC ' S study. [Ref. 35:p. 21]
J. APPLICATION OF CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET (CRAF) CONCEPT
TO DOD'S RAIL REQUIREMENTS.
As previously mentioned, the CRAF program provides an
expedient method to augment DOD-owned aircraft in the event
of a national emergency. The same approach is viable for the
DFRIF with some differences. Inactive railcars could be
maintained by the railroads and prepositioned near
installations with early deployment requirements. Research
is currently being conducted to document the availability of
commercial heavy-lift railcars. [Ref. 35:p. 13]
Additionally, rail asset enhancement by means of defense
feature installation (strengthen floors and chain tie-downs)
could increase DOD ' s readiness posture. [Ref. 35:p. 13]
Trailer Train Corporation owns most of the general purpose
flatcars employed commercially and militarily. However, these
flatcars barely meet DOD heavy lift requirements. Trailer
Train cars will be tested to determine their lift capacities,
what enhancements are required, and the resulting costs.
[Ref. 35:p. 14]
As previously stated, the rail industry is employing
container ization and the use of specialized railcars.
General purpose flatcars aren't in demand, and "incorporating
defense features on double stack cars, articulated five
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platform cars, plastic pellet covered hoppers, and tank cars
is impractical." [Ref. 35:p. 14]
Due to the length of time required to obtain and place
rail assets where needed, use of existing CRAF
procedures to identify and obtain specific cars to meet
early deploying requirements in a contingency would
prove ineffective. However, using the CRAF concept could
allow DOD to direct commercial railcars to specific
loading locations to meet follow-on requirements. This
concept is being further evaluated to assess its
practicality. [Ref. 35:p. 14]
K. DFRIF STUDY CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
1. DOD should not sell or scrap its rail assets.
Instead, DOD should continue to own and operate
existing DFRIF equipment to meet its peacetime
and contingency railcar needs.
2. DOD should pursue the possibility of establishing
a CRAF-type program for rail as a means to
augment the DFRIF in a contingency.
3. If the requirements determined in Part II of
MTMC ' s study so warrant, DOD should also pursue
the enhancement of existing, commercially-owned
rail assets, as a means of improving DOD '
s
contingency readiness [Ref. 35:p. 23].
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
An effort has been made in this thesis to address defense
transportation issues within each TOA which could impact upon
DOD ' s ability to deploy and sustain military forces
worldwide. A brief summary of each major chapter follows:
1. Chapter II, Military Sealift Command. In this
chapter, the demise of breakbulk shipping and its
effect on DOD sealift capability was analyzed.
The results indicate that breakbulk shipping is
not a critical factor in overall strategic
mobility. The vessels most suitable for the
majority of logistical support scenarios are the
RO/RO, barge-carrying vessels, containerships
,
and breakbulk, in generally that order.
2. Chapter III, Military Airlift Command. The
civilian airline industry's ability to augment
organic airlift resources in the event of a
national emergency was the focus of this chapter.
Current projections are that the CRAF will
increase strategic capability by 50*. However,
several problems exist which reduce this
projection significantly. These problems are (1)
a shrinking air cargo industry, (2) a lack of
compensation to offset specific risks outlined by
the airline industry, (3) MAC ' s inability to
project long-range cargo requirements, (4)
stringent CRAF entrance requirements, and (5) an
ASIF funding shortfall. Options available to MAC
include acquiring and storing freighters for
future activation, requiring the installation of
defense features in civil aircraft, and providing
additional incentives to the airline industry.
These options may resolve some of the issues;
however, the primary problem appears to exist
within the MAC ' s management of the system (see
(3) , 4) , and (5) above)
.
3. Chapter IV, Military Traffic Management Command.
This chapter questioned the rationale behind
DOD-owned rail assets, whether or not industry
could meet DOD peacetime and mobilization
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requirements, and the feasibility of instituting
a CRAF-type program for rail. Subsequent
conclusions were that industry could not meet DOD
requirements, thereby supporting the need for
DOD-owned rail. Additionally, the establishment
of a CRAF-type program is feasible, to include a
defense feature enhancement program.
A final question remains. Will the newly developed
USTRANSCOM help or hinder the strategic capability of the
TOAs? This question will be addressed in the remainder of
the chapter.
B. UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (USTRANSCOM)
The primary purpose for developing a USTRANSCOM was to
"establish a single unified command to integrate global air,
land, arid sea transport." [Ref. 36:p. 39] Also referred to
as the Unified Transportation Command (TransCom), the
organization not only monitors peacetime transportation
assets but also orchestrates the deployment of personnel and
materiel worldwide prior to and subsequent to a war.
[Ref. 36: p. 39]
The MAC Commander is responsible for TransCom, which will
be co-located with MAC at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.
The command will consist of approximately 500 personnel, and
the MAC Commander will be responsible for all ships,
aircraft, rail cars, and port management facilities required
for a joint deployment. These assets are controlled by the
three TOAs and will be allocated in the following manner
during a joint deployment effort:
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1. MSC will provide 51 of its 150 ships for a joint
deployment. In the event of a war, 116 ships
from the RRF v^ill be utilized. [Ref. 36:p. 40]
2. MAC will provide 234 C-141 "Star 1 if ters , " 77 C-5
aircraft, and 500 C-130 "Hercules" transports
[Ref. 36:p. 40]. Also, the CRAF will be
activated should a war occur.
3. MTMC will be responsible for delivering requisite
supplies to the MSC ships, as v/ell as embarkation
and debarkation requirements. [Ref. 36:p. 40]
The TOA commanders will continue to manage their
organizations through their respective service secretaries
during peacetime operations; however, during a joint
deployment, they will report to the TransCom commander.
TransCom will advise the TOAs of available transportation
assets and what supplies are available once they are engaged
in battle. Additionally, the resupply of land, sea, and air
contingencies will be controlled by TransCom. [Ref. 36;p.
40]
The installation of TransCom is designed to eradicate
previous problems experienced with the much criticized Joint
Deployment Agency (JDA). The JDA did not have the authority
to order required information from the TOA commanders (who
were reluctant to share the information) whereas the TransCom
commander, as a Commander-in-Chief (CINC), will. [Ref. 36 :p.
43]
Support for the TransCom is divided. Former Navy
Secretary Lehman, responsible for the veto of the previous
attempt to merge MTMC and MSC, sees no use for the TransCom.
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"To take the Military Sealift Ccmmand and put it out in
Illinois under an Air Force commander has to be taking the
process of reorganization for its own sake to an absurd
extreme," said Secretary Lehman [Ref. 36:p. 44]. Marine
Commandant Gen. Kelley proposes further research into the
matter by a civilian think tank. His concern is that
dedicated Marine resources could be utilized for joint
deployments versus solely Marine Corps operations. [Ref.
36 :p. 44]
Additional concerns were voiced by the Navy, Marine
Corps, and Army: What does the MAC commander know about
sealift? Will he be objective when it comes to allocating
scarce resources between the TOAs? Says Air Force Col. F.
Selzer, head of the strategic mobility division in the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Logistics Directorate, the Navy will have an
opportunity to address any problems with the defense
secretary and Congress in the event of any conflict. [Ref.
36:pp. 44, 45]
On the positive side of the debate, MSC ' s deputy
director of plans states that TransCom will ensure that the
TOAs allocate monies for the automated data processing ( ADP
)
master plan which will consolidate the logistical data bases
of the TOAs. Should there be any reluctance on the part of
the TOAs to participate, the TransCom commander can confer
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman and the SECDEF for
additional support. Additionally, the TransCom commander
will be a member of the Defense Resources Board, a vehicle
which to sell his programs. Finally, the TransCom commander
not only develops deployment plans, but he has execution
authority. [Ref. 36:p. 44]
Although there is considerable debate over the
establishment of the TransCom, the TOAs and other interested
parties are going to have to accept it. "The objections of
all the devil's advocates were heard at the highest levels.
TransCom is here to stay," says MSC ' s deputy director of





The MSC has overcome the breakbulk shipping issue through
a combination of acquisitions, conversions, and new ships.
The MTMC has defined, justified, and acquired rail assets to
support its mobility requirements. The MAC, however, appears
to have the most difficult problems to resolve. Not only
does MAC have the enormous task of resolving the internal and
external problems related to the CRAF and insufficient lift
capacity, but its commander now has the responsibility of
TransCom. This thesis addressed one issue per TOA, and it is
recognized that there may be other aspects of each TOA that
pose major internal and external problems affecting strategic
mobility. However, based upon the research completed, the
MAC'S ability to effectively assume additional transportation
responsibilities seems questionable.
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IWith respect to the management of overall DOD
transportation resources, the TOA most capable of currently
meeting its mobilization requirements would be the optimal
choice for TransCom commander. This would lend credibility
to the TransCom and facilitate "big picture" planning on the
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